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ABSTRACT
Decisions about the adoption of medical interventions are informed by evidence on their costs and effects. For a range of rea-
sons, evidence relating to medical devices may be limited. The decision to adopt a device early in its life cycle when the evi-
dence base is least maturemay impact on the prospects of acquiring further evidence to reduce uncertainties. Equally, rejecting
a device will result in no uptake in practice and hence no chance to learn about performance. Decision options such as ‘only in
research’ or ‘approval with research’ can overcome these issues by allowing patients early access to promising new technol-
ogies while limiting the risks associated with making incorrect decisions until more evidence or learning is established. In this
paper, we set out the issues relating to uncertainty and the value of research speciﬁc to devices: learning curve effects, incre-
mental device innovation, investment and irrecoverable costs, and dynamic pricing. We show the circumstances under which
an only in research or approval with research scheme may be an appropriate policy choice. We also consider how the value of
additional research might be shared between the manufacturer and health sector to help inform who might reasonably be
expected to conduct the research needed. © 2017 The Authors. Health Economics published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Establishing the clinical effectiveness and cost effectiveness of medical devices relies on evidence which is
often less extensive and lower in quantity than evidence for many pharmaceutical products. This is largely
because the evidence requirements for medical devices to achieve a CE mark is less demanding. Unlike phar-
maceuticals, where evidence on efﬁcacy and safety is legally required before marketing authorisation is
obtained, devices usually only need to demonstrate performance and safety, with the CE mark acquired close
to the point of market entry (Drummond et al., 2009; Sorenson et al., 2011). The availability of the device early
may appear attractive as it can lead to rapid clinical uptake; however, decisions about the use of the device
when the evidence base is least mature carry substantial risk. Uncertainty about the efﬁcacy of the device
and the learning or training required to achieve the desired efﬁcacy can result in adverse consequences on
patient outcomes and lead to an ineffective use of healthcare resources. Rapid approval of new entrants can also
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result in disincentive effects for manufacturers to invest in further research which would reduce these uncer-
tainties (Claxton et al., 2012).
Balancing the value of early access to a technology and the value of additional evidence to resolve uncertainty
have led to the development of novel approaches for reimbursement and coverage decisions under conditions of
uncertainty (Claxton et al., 2012; McCabe et al., 2010; Staﬁnski et al., 2010; Walker et al., 2012). For example,
Claxton et al. (2012) developed a comprehensive algorithm to inform the sequence of assessments and judge-
ments which lead to conditional coverage decisions of ‘only in research’ (OIR) and ‘approval with research’
(AWR) for health technologies (Claxton et al., 2012). These conditional coverage options allow patients early ac-
cess to promising new technologies and permit manufacturers to make a return on investment, while limiting the
risks associated withmaking decisions until additional evidence and/or further learning establishes value. Even in
health systems where there is an absence of ﬁrm budget constraints or where economic analysis is not explicitly
incorporated into a decision making process, the same principles can be usefully applied to establish the value of
additional research. For example, an assessment of uncertainty and the expected health beneﬁts of additional ev-
idence can be obtained directly from the results of standard meta-analysis or evidence on clinical effectiveness
alone (Claxton et al., 2015). Therefore, regardless of the policy context, some consideration should be given to
the characterisation of uncertainty in the assessment of medical devices and determining future research needs.
The unique characteristics associated with medical devices such as rapid incremental innovation, learning
effects and upfront irrecoverable costs, all present a challenge for the timing of reimbursement decisions and
the value of waiting until additional evidence is conducted to support the technology. This means that condi-
tional coverage decisions and possible risk sharing schemes (between the manufacturer and health sector)
become even more important. One of the complexities associated with the evaluation of medical devices is
the fact that any decision about the adoption of the device will also interact with the ability to gather more
evidence and may affect future commercial developments of the technology. There is also a close link between
the value of the device, the value of further research to reduce uncertainty and the price of the device. These
links can offer incentives for manufacturers to price accordingly and decide whether there is sufﬁcient value
from further evaluative research. It also helps to establish how the value of the device and the value of future
research might be shared between the manufacturer and the health sector in order to inform who might reason-
ably be expected to pay for (conduct) the research. Manufacturers also need an approach to make rapid deci-
sions at the start of product development and to revisit the decision to continue development and research at
different points in the development cycle. One example is the ‘Headroom Approach’ which has been discussed
in the context of medical devices (Girling et al., 2015).
The purpose of this paper is to set out a framework for characterising uncertainty and informing coverage de-
cisions in the assessment of medical devices. The framework is based on a number of common principles that are
required for all technologies and a number of additional considerations or challenges speciﬁc to devices. The
common principles are outlined ﬁrst. We then present a more detailed description of the additional challenges
(or ones which are more accentuated) for an assessment of uncertainty and the value of further research for de-
vices. For some of the speciﬁc challenges, we use results from a case study of enhanced external counterpulsation
(EECP), which is a device used to provide symptomatic relief from chronic refractory angina. EECP as an adjunct
to standard therapy has previously been compared with standard therapy alone to estimate its expected cost-
effectiveness and uncertainty associated with reimbursement decisions from a UK perspective (McKenna
et al., 2010). Full details have been described elsewhere (McKenna and Claxton, 2011; McKenna et al., 2015).
We use EECP to show the implications of signiﬁcant irrecoverable costs and price changes on coverage decisions.
2. FRAMEWORK FOR CHARACTERISING UNCERTAINTY
A framework for characterising uncertainty is presented in Figure 1. This framework is based on a number of
common principles that are required for all technologies: an assessment of the value of a technology, the value
of additional evidence, the signiﬁcance of investment and irrecoverable costs, future changes and the likelihood
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Figure 1. Framework for characterising uncertainty in medical devices
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of research being conducted. Each of these elements is discussed brieﬂy in the next sections and more detail is
provided elsewhere (Claxton et al., 2012; Claxton et al., 2016).
2.1. The value of a technology
A technology, whether it is a medical device or pharmaceutical, is considered to represent a value if its addi-
tional health beneﬁts are expected to exceed the health forgone from curtailing other activities to accommodate
the technologyˈs additional costs, that is the technology is only considered cost-effective if it offers positive net
health beneﬁts. This holds true in both budget-constrained healthcare systems, where there is a threshold of
cost-effectiveness representing the opportunity costs that fall on health expenditure and systems where there
is an absence of ﬁrm budget constraints but where opportunity costs manifest in terms of other forms of expen-
diture, for example through increased taxation or co-payments (Drummond et al., 2015). Therefore, the ﬁrst
assessment for any technology is its expected cost-effectiveness based on the evidence that is currently avail-
able. This relies on information about the technologyˈs effectiveness, its impact on long-term health (including
potential adverse consequences), additional costs and an assessment of the opportunity costs of the health that
is likely to be forgone as a consequence of adoption.
2.2. Signiﬁcance of investment and irrecoverable costs
Investment costs that are sunk costs cannot be recovered if a decision about the technology is changed in the future.
These irrecoverable costs are most commonly thought of as investment costs associated with the capital expendi-
ture on equipment, new facilities or training and learning costs. Typically these costs are annuitized and allocated
as per-patient costs by spreading the cost over the number of patients likely to be treated during the lifetime of the
technology (or in the case of training and learning costs until performance has reached a steady state). If the
adoption decision is unchanged throughout this period and there is no decision to take the device off the list of
funded interventions, allocation of costs pro-rata has no inﬂuence. However, if a decision to end adoption changes
before the end of the lifetime of the technology, these costs cannot be recovered. Therefore, any signiﬁcant irre-
coverable costs should be consideredwhen assessing the value of a technology. Theremay also be costs associated
with the removal of a technology from clinical practice if a decision about the technology changes in the future.
2.3. The value of additional evidence
The value of a technology in terms of its expected cost-effectiveness is based on the balance of evidence cur-
rently available. However, uncertainty in the existing evidence is unavoidable. This uncertainty arises from a
number of sources including the evaluation of a technology early in its life cycle when the evidence base is least
mature, establishing a treatment effect which often depends on the ability to approximate the counterfactual in
the studied population, disentangling the interaction between effectiveness and user experience, establishing
causal relationships between outcomes, combining multiple sources of evidence on the same outcome, missing
information and assessing the transferability of study ﬁndings to a population or setting of interest. This eviden-
tial uncertainty ultimately leads to uncertainty in the decision to adopt the technology. Additional evidence can
reduce this uncertainty and therefore reduce the risk of making an incorrect decision about the use of the tech-
nology. An assessment of uncertainty, its consequences in terms of health lost from an incorrect decision and
the need for further research is required. The value of further research can be informed through methods of
value of information analysis, which can also be used to inform the type and design of proposed research
(Briggs et al., 2006). Some assessment of the likelihood that research is conducted, the length of time for re-
search to report and the costs of conducting research are also required.
2.4. Incentivising research
An assessment of the value of additional evidence provides an incentive to the healthcare system to ensure that the
type of research required is conducted without incurring signiﬁcant irrecoverable costs. However, manufacturers
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may only retain an incentive to conduct research if a technology is rejected for use but for which they believe there
are additional beneﬁts which have not been evidenced. Some consideration of how the value of the technology
and the value of additional research might be shared between the manufacturer and the healthcare system might
inform whether manufacturers could reasonably be expected to conduct the research (or make a contribution to
the costs of publically funded research whichmight beneﬁt their technology). Appropriate incentives or risk shar-
ing agreements between the manufacturer and the healthcare sector should encourage and reward investment in
the technology if it represents value to both sectors. Identifying situations when social and commercial values do
not match and how costs and beneﬁts might be shared between sectors is an important consideration. The payer
may also inﬂuence the type, quantity and likelihood that the research is conducted.
2.5. Future changes
Further research is unlikely to be able to resolve all uncertainty. Some sources of uncertainty that cannot be
reduced by further research may resolve by other changes occurring over time. For example, the effective price
of the technology and/or its comparators may change in the future. The price clearly plays a key role in deter-
mining the value of the technology, but it also affects the level of uncertainty by changing the likelihood of
making an incorrect decision and the value of further research. The information generated by research will
not be valuable indeﬁnitely as new and more effective interventions may become available and make the infor-
mation no longer relevant to future clinical practice. Therefore, new or incremental innovation will also change
the value of a technology and the future value of research.
2.6. The value of early access
Early access to a technology is considered to represent value if the expected health beneﬁts of approval are greater
than the opportunity costs that may be forgone to future patients. These opportunity costs include the potential
value of research forgone as a consequence of early access (e.g. if the research needed to resolve uncertainty is
not conducted once patients have access to the technology) and the irrecoverable costs associated with reversing
decisions (e.g. investment costs or learning, revealing that the technology is not as effective as expected). If the
expected beneﬁts are judged to be less than the opportunity costs then the commitment of irrecoverable opportu-
nity costs (negative net health beneﬁt) should be avoided, whereas if they are judged to be greater, then early ac-
cess would be considered appropriate. This assessment is informed by the aforementioned considerations of the
long-term value of research, the signiﬁcance of investment and irrecoverable costs and the impact of future
changes on both the value of the technology and the future value of research and/or learning.
2.7. Coverage decisions
The aforementioned considerations lead to one of four decision options for a technology:
i Approve: The technology is approved for widespread use on the basis that the evidence currently avail-
able suggests that it represents value to the healthcare system.
ii Reject: The technology is rejected for widespread use on the grounds that the evidence currently avail-
able suggests that it does not represent value to the healthcare system.
iii Only in research (OIR): The technology is only available to patients involved in research, that is it is
rejected for widespread use until further evidence establishes value.
iv Approval with research (AWR): The technology is approved for widespread use but conditioned upon
the collection of additional evidence to support its use. This option means that the decision to approve
the technology may be revised once the results of the research are established.1
1In many cases, however, there is often a ‘dragging effect’ where it is often hard to dismiss the use of a technology altogether once it has
already been in use (approved). This has implications on costs in general and particularly on sunk or irrecoverable costs.
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Each decision option is based on the balance of evidence supporting the value of the technology, the value of
additional evidence, future changes and the likelihood of research being conducted. Trade-offs, which can be
expressed in terms of net health beneﬁts, occur under each decision option: Approval may mean that the type
of research needed is not possible (ethical concerns, recruitment difﬁculties and limited incentives for manufac-
turers); rejection restricts access to a promising new technology if the actual health beneﬁts are greater than ex-
pected; OIR restricts access until further research establishes value; and AWR may result in subsequent
withdrawal of the technology when further research is completed.
3. MEDICAL DEVICE CHARACTERISTICS AND UNCERTAINTY
The evaluation of medical devices raises a number of challenges over and above those for other technologies
(Drummond et al., 2009; Sorenson et al., 2011). Devices also cover a wide range of products for which quite
different issues may arise for the different class of device. The challenges which are often more accentuated for
the assessment of uncertainty in the evaluation of devices are as follows: learning curve effects; incremental
device innovation; investment and irrecoverable costs; dynamic pricing; and incentivising further research.
Each of these challenges and the implications for coverage decisions are discussed in the next sections.
3.1. Learning curve
When medical devices are diffused into clinical practice, there is often a learning curve relating to user skills
and training with the technology. This learning curve can have an important impact on the efﬁcacy and perfor-
mance of the device. The challenge for the evaluation of devices is the difﬁculty of disentangling the ‘true’ ef-
ﬁcacy of the technology from the efﬁcacy derived from the interaction between effectiveness and clinical
experience using the technology. An early assessment of the technology is likely to be biased against the
new technology as the performance of repeated tasks by the user is expected to change with experience over
time (Ramsay et al., 2001). The learning curve effect plays a signiﬁcant role in any type of device that requires
a new advanced skill set. An excellent example of the effects of learning comes from the Carotid Revascular-
ization Endarterectomy versus Stenting Trial where the results from stenting appeared worse than endarterec-
tomy in the early years of the trial because clinicians had only limited experience at that stage (Girling et al.,
2015). The learning curve effect can depend on a number of underlying mechanisms, for example user expe-
rience, community experience/system learning and case-mix of patients in a given centre. These mechanisms
will not only change the estimate of effectiveness but will also affect the scale of the uncertainty over time, with
greater uncertainty anticipated during the early stages of learning.
Methods for the statistical assessment of the learning curve are reported in Ramsay et al. (2001) (Ramsay
et al., 2001), while estimates of the learning curve proﬁle could be obtained through formal elicitation of the
judgements of clinical experts. For example, Cook et al. (2012) showed that information on current practice,
prior experience and beliefs regarding acquiring proﬁciency and the learning curve for two surgical procedures
(open and arthroscopic rotator cuff repair) could be elicited in order to assess the likelihood of expertise
impacting upon trial results (Cook et al., 2012).
The proﬁle of investment risk associated with learning is important for coverage decisions as approval of the
technology or AWR may commit opportunity costs of negative net beneﬁt which are irrecoverable. For exam-
ple, if the technology is approved for widespread use in the early stages of learning (with the anticipation that
users will become more experienced) and this decision is later revised, either due to more user experience re-
vealing that the technology is not as effective as initially expected or additional research and/or other changes
reporting this, then these initial losses will have been incurred and cannot be compensated by later gains. In
order to judge the most appropriate coverage decision at a particular point on the learning curve, the net beneﬁt
for the new technology relative to its comparator(s) is estimated on the basis of the evidence available at that
point. An estimate of the expected net beneﬁt from further research (taking account of the number of patients
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who can beneﬁt from research, the likelihood that research will be conducted and the time for research to re-
port) is also required to inform the beneﬁts associated with an AWR or OIR decision. Figure 2 illustrates the
net beneﬁt for coverage decisions at different points on the learning curve. In this example, OIR offers the best
return at points early in the learning curve where there is most uncertainty (e.g. T1 with less user experience).
This is because OIR avoids the consequences of committing negative net beneﬁt until a more informed decision
can be made with further experience and/or research reporting. A decision made at a later point on the learning
curve (e.g. T2) suggests that AWR offers the best return, while at a point even later (e.g. T3), the net beneﬁt
from AWR is insufﬁcient to outweigh the opportunity cost of not approving the technology. In reality, how-
ever, removing a technology once it has been approved for use is often difﬁcult in practice. For example, when
drug-eluting stents (DES) were ﬁrst introduced, evidence was scarce but very positive. In some jurisdictions,
DES were approved with research, and clinicians were obliged to gather additional data on costs and effective-
ness. When this new evidence was assessed, DES turned out to be much less effective than suggested at uptake
compared with bare-metal stents. However, in many cases, DES still continued to be used with some jurisdic-
tions trying to limit their use to particular subgroups of patients only.
Coverage decisions when there is a learning curve are further complicated by the fact that the rate of learning
through user experience is also affected by the rate of uptake of the technology in practice. For example, if the
technology is rejected, there will be no uptake and hence no chance to learn further about the technology. If
the technology is accepted only in the context of suitable research (OIR), then there will be slow uptake and slow
learning. If the technology is approved, either conditionally or unconditionally on research being completed (i.e.
Approve or AWR), the uptake of the technology will be greater and learning should reach a steady state at a faster
rate. It is expected that Approve might have a greater uptake than AWR as the decision to approve conditional on
research suggests signiﬁcant levels of uncertainty and perhaps more caution in the use of the technology. This
creates a situation where the learning curve not only affects the coverage decision but the coverage decision also
affects the rate of uptake and learning. Given these concerns, ‘Approval but in a limited number of centres’may
be an appropriate policy option when there is a learning curve. This could potentially maximise the speed of
learning while minimising initial investment costs in capital support and/or training. This may also overcome
the difﬁculties associated with removing a technology from widespread use at a later point in time when a more
informed decision can be made. It is also worth noting that the rate of uptake may not only vary by the type of
approval but also by the type of social system in which the device is implemented. For example, the different
Figure 2. An illustration of coverage decisions at different points on the learning curve. AWR, approval with research; OIR, only in research
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coverage decisions may support varying adoption behaviours, particularly in relation to the diffusion of the med-
ical device in practice and the likelihood of ‘fast followers’ imitating the innovation (Rogers, 2003).
3.2. Incremental device innovation
Devices frequently undergo product modiﬁcations with new methods, upgrades and capabilities. This is partly
linked to the desire to get devices to the market as quickly as possible and then follow with improved modiﬁ-
cations. It is also linked to the interaction between clinical experience using the device and the device itself. For
example, a substantial proportion of incremental innovation comes from end-users suggesting small improve-
ments to manufacturers. An excellent example of this is the transcatheter aortic valve implantation. Implantable
devices are often associated with newer generations with improved batter capacity and lower likelihood of im-
plant failure, for example implantable cardioverter-deﬁbrillator. As a consequence of incremental innovation,
clinical efﬁcacy and outcomes are unlikely to have reached a steady state when ﬁrst evaluated. Therefore,
the level of evidence depends critically on the position of the technology in the pathway of its life cycle. This
suggests that an evaluation cannot be a one-off activity, and an iterative approach may be required with revi-
sions being made to the estimates as more evidence emerges over time (Drummond et al., 2009; Murphy,
2013; Vallejo-Torres et al., 2011). This will have implications for coverage decisions as it may be better to
withhold approval until a later point is reached in the technologyˈs life cycle. However, any decision that is
made will also interact with the ability to gather additional evidence because of the close link between incre-
mental developments and user experience.
Bayesian approaches to the synthesis of evidence which is evolving over time are particularly ﬂexible for
this purpose because they facilitate combining prior information from early evaluations of the technology with
more updated evidence as it becomes available (Girling et al., 2015). An iterative Bayesian approach could be
used to address the question of the ‘optimal’ timing of adoption or reimbursement decisions. The value of con-
tinued development will require estimates of expected costs and beneﬁts, an assessment of uncertainty and the
need for further evidence at each developmental milestone. These estimates may provide a way of establishing
the ‘optimum point’ to adopt the technology in its life cycle. This is even more important once it is recognised
that a decision about the adoption of the technology for widespread use will also interact with the ability to
gather more evidence on effectiveness and may affect future commercial developments of the technology. In
this case, consideration should also be given on how to maximise and speed up the rate of learning because
most incremental innovation comes through end-user experience.
Incremental innovation is of beneﬁt to both the healthcare system and the manufacturer. The manufacturer
can learn from early use of the technology and to incrementally adapt it according to experience learned. The
healthcare system beneﬁts from improvements in net beneﬁt over time. The value of incremental innovation to
both sectors at different points in the technologyˈs life cycle may be assessed in a similar manner to that de-
scribed in Section 3.5.
3.3. Investment and irrecoverable costs
Compared with other technologies, costs associated with medical devices are more likely to become sunk costs
if a decision is changed in the future. This is particularly the case for devices that have a large upfront invest-
ment cost associated with the capital purchase of equipment, for example magnetic resonance imaging
machine. These upfront costs are usually annuitized and allocated as per-patient costs.
If future changes lead to subsequent withdrawal of coverage of the technology before the end of the lifetime
of the equipment, these costs represent irrecoverable costs. The irreversible nature of implantable devices also
represents an irrecoverable cost. For example, if the implantable device turns out not to be as effective as ini-
tially thought, reversing the decision is less straightforward compared with drugs which can be stopped, often
immediately, without incurring any additional costs. There may also be wider organisational implications from
introducing a device into clinical practice. This may include training and learning costs and/or infrastructure
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adjustments such as the requirement for a specialised room (e.g. to limit radiation exposure from a new X-ray
machine).
An assessment of the signiﬁcance of these irrecoverable costs is required before commitment to the costs is
made through approval of the technology or AWR. The potential signiﬁcance depends on the following: (i)
whether the estimate of cost-effectiveness would alter if a decision were to be revised earlier than anticipated;
(ii) the likelihood that the decision might be altered; and (iii) the size of the irrecoverable costs as a proportion
of the total costs of the technology. Figure 3 shows the net health beneﬁt2 for EECP compared with control (no
EECP treatment) for a UK population of current and future patients whose treatment choice is to be informed
by the decision. The initial costs of treatment with EECP are high and far in excess of the immediate health
beneﬁts resulting in negative net beneﬁt in the early years of treatment. This negative net beneﬁt is offset by
positive net beneﬁt in later periods but it is not until 17 years that the healthcare system recoups the investment.
If research reports (or other changes occur) before this breakeven point of 17 years, there is a chance that the
results of the research will indicate that the technology is not cost-effective, and approval is withdrawn. In this
case, the initial losses are sunk costs because the additional health gains are not accumulated in a sufﬁcient
number of patients to outweigh the upfront investment costs. Even in the absence of capital costs, EECP ex-
hibits irrecoverable costs, as shown in Figure 3 for non-capital expenditure, but the proﬁle of investment is less
risky, that is breaks even earlier at 6 years. The time horizon for the technology is also an important consider-
ation. If approval is withdrawn before the end of the lifetime of the technology, the potential loss in net beneﬁt
is large because the capital costs allocated pro-rata to treating future patients cannot be recovered. In circum-
stances where there are signiﬁcant irrecoverable investment costs, OIR avoids the commitment of these costs
and preserves the option to approve the technology at a later date when the proﬁle of investment is less risky.
In reality, this is more likely to be the case for a single product such as EECP but may be less signiﬁcant for a
Figure 3. Cumulative incremental net beneﬁt of enhanced external counterpulsation (EECP) compared with control for the population of
current and future patients whose treatment choice is to be informed by the decision. QALYs, quality-adjusted life years
2Net health beneﬁt of an intervention is the health gain expected from the intervention relative to its comparator (incremental effectiveness)
minus the health gain forgone elsewhere in other programmes by diverting resources (incremental costs) to the intervention under consid-
eration (incremental costs/threshold of cost-effectiveness). If the net health beneﬁt of the intervention exceeds that of the comparator (i.e.
incremental net health beneﬁt is greater than zero), the intervention is considered to represent value compared with the comparator given
the threshold of cost-effectiveness.
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family of devices such as stents (e.g. the sunk costs associated with the ﬁrst introduction of DES in the market
were not a major issue because the investment costs associated with training and catheterisation labs were borne
when percutaneous coronary intervention with stents was introduced).
3.4. Dynamic pricing
For medical devices, prices are much more likely to change over time compared with pharmaceuticals. This is
largely due to the market entry of new products, iterative incremental developments over time and more ﬂexible
procurement for devices (Drummond et al., 2009; Sorenson et al., 2011). The price of the device and/or com-
parators clearly plays a key role in determining whether the device is expected to be cost-effective. However,
the price will also have important implications for uncertainty and the value of additional evidence. In its sim-
plest form, if the price of the technology is reduced, there will be greater beneﬁts of early access to the technol-
ogy, and if the technology is already expected to be of value at the original price, the value of additional
evidence will tend to fall. The outcome of a decision about the technology can also directly inﬂuence pricing.
For example, the price for the comparator technology (i.e. the one that is not considered to be cost-effective)
may be rapidly driven down, and it might fall faster than the price of the new technology, changing the implied
estimate of cost-effectiveness and level of uncertainty (Drummond et al., 2009).
The price at which a technology would just be expected to be cost-effective is commonly referred to as the
value-based price for the technology. It describes the threshold price at the point of indifference between
accepting and rejecting the technology (assuming that there is no uncertainty in cost-effectiveness). At this
price, the incremental net beneﬁt for the technology is zero; therefore, it represents the maximum price that
the healthcare system can afford to pay for the technology without imposing negative net beneﬁt (Claxton
et al., 2008). However, in most circumstances, there is uncertainty and a number of other value-based prices
exist, each of which represents the threshold price at which the decision option changes. For example, OIR
for a technology, which is expected to be cost-effective but with uncertainty (or signiﬁcant irrecoverable costs),
Figure 4. Price thresholds based on the maximum net health beneﬁt of different decision options for enhanced external counterpulsation
(EECP) when research takes 3 years to report. Net health beneﬁt is expressed at a population level for current and future patients whose
treatment choice is to be informed by the decision. QALYs, quality-adjusted life years.
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might be revised to Approve with a sufﬁcient price reduction. Similarly, AWR might be revised to Approve if
the beneﬁts of early approval now exceed the value of additional evidence.
Figure 4 shows the price thresholds at which the decision changes for EECP based on the maximum net
health beneﬁt of the different decision options when research takes 3 years to report. The decision option on
the outer envelope of the curves is the one which offers the highest net beneﬁt at each price. Although EECP,
on the balance of evidence, is expected to be cost-effective at its current price of £4347 per patient in the UK,
OIR offers greater expected net health beneﬁt at this price. This is because it avoids the commitment of signif-
icant irrecoverable costs which cannot be recovered if the results of research indicate that its initial approval
should be withdrawn (McKenna and Claxton, 2011). The price to ensure unrestricted access to EECP, that is
not restricting to OIR, needs to be considerably lower because of the signiﬁcant irrecoverable opportunity costs.
For example, the price threshold for AWR | OIR, that is the price below which AWR offers the highest net ben-
eﬁt and the price above which OIR offers the best return, is 18% below the effective price of EECP. A price
reduction of just over 60% would be required for approval of EECP without conditional access (i.e. price
threshold for Approve | AWR).
3.5. Incentives for further research
The threshold price for the different decision options represents the maximum price that the healthcare system
can afford to pay at the time that the medical device is being evaluated and when the results of any subsequent
research have not yet been undertaken. Manufacturers may only retain an incentive to conduct the research that
is needed if they believe that there are additional beneﬁts which have not been evidenced at the time of the eval-
uation (Claxton et al., 2012). Consideration of how the value of the technology and the value of additional re-
search might be shared between the manufacturer and the health sector can help to inform who might
reasonably be expected to pay for (conduct) the research speciﬁed under AWR or OIR.
Table 1a illustrates an example of a technology that is expected to be effective based on the evidence avail-
able at the time of the evaluation (i.e. without research, the expected change in quality-adjusted life years,
ΔQALYs, relative to its comparator technology is positive), but it is not certain to be effective (i.e. under some
realisations of uncertainty, the technology has a negative impact on health, corresponding to a negative change
in quality-adjusted life years, e.g. realisation 3). The price of the technology is ﬁxed at the value-based price so
that, on average, the change in net beneﬁt for the technology, ΔNB, is equal to zero. In other words, without
further research to resolve the uncertainty in effectiveness, the health system is expected to gain (or lose) noth-
ing from the use of the technology, while the manufacturer is expected to gain a revenue equivalent to
3 QALYs. Here, the additional costs of the technology, ΔCosts, are assumed to represent acquisition costs
and are expressed in terms of health beneﬁts, that is the additional costs are expressed as the health that will
be forgone elsewhere in other programmes by diverting resources to this technology (e.g. additional costs of
£60 000 are divided by the threshold of cost-effectiveness of £20 000 per QALY to give 3 QALYs). There
is a chance that a decision to approve the technology could result in a loss of 6 QALYs, with a probability
of loss equal to one-third (see realisation 3 in Table 1a). The health system can avoid this loss by ensuring that
further research is conducted under an AWR or OIR decision. The results of research indicate whether the tech-
nology would be accepted or rejected for a particular realisation of uncertainty (Table 1b). The expectation over
the possible realisations in Table 1b indicates that both the health system and the manufacturer could gain an
additional 2 QALYs from further research.
The question that now remains is who might reasonably be expected to pay for this research? The value of
research to the manufacturer is 2 QALYs only if the original decision was OIR (Table 1c). If the original de-
cision was AWR, the manufacturer would have no incentive to conduct the research as it could result in a po-
tential loss of 1 QALY (because revenue before research was equivalent to 3 QALYs). Therefore, research only
runs a risk to manufacturers that approval is withdrawn under some realisations of uncertainty. In these circum-
stances, it might only be reasonable to expect the health sector to pay for or conduct the research. It is unlikely
that a possible trade could be negotiated between the manufacturer and health sector whereby the manufacturer
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compensates the health system for not doing the research; because in this case, the manufacturer would only be
willing to pay up to 1 QALY in such a trade, but the health system would need a minimum of 2 QALYs to
forgo the research. If the original decision was OIR, both sectors could potentially share the costs of the
research. However, the costs of the research must also fall below 2 QALYs for the research to be of potential
value to either the health sector or manufacturer. Determining how the costs and beneﬁts might be shared
between sectors and identifying situations when the social and commercial values do not always match are
important considerations for incentivising further research and innovation in medical devices.
The gain from research to the manufacturer and health system will also vary depending on the uncertainty
pattern and the potential information asymmetry between both sectors. Table 1a–c describes a situation where
the technology is not certain to be effective and the manufacturer and health sector could share the value of
research. However, this share and who should pay for the research will also depend on the informational advan-
tage that the manufacturer could potentially have. For example, if the manufacturer took a more optimistic view
Table 1c. An illustration of the value of further research to the manufacturer and health sector: payoff
c Payoff
Decision option Health sector Manufacturer
Approve 0 3
Reject 0 0
With research 2 2
Value of research 2 1 (AWR)
2 (OIR)
AWR, approval with research; OIR, only in research.
Table 1b. An illustration of the value of further research to the manufacturer and health sector: with research
b With research
Decision ΔNB Revenue
Accept 6 3
Accept 0 3
Reject 0 0
Expectation 2 2
NB, net beneﬁt.
Table 1a. An illustration of the value of further research to the manufacturer and health sector: without research
a
Without research
Realisation of uncertainty ΔCosts ΔQALYs ΔNB
1 3 9 6
2 3 3 0
3 3 3 6
Expectation 3 3 0
QALYs, quality-adjusted life years; NB, net beneﬁt.
ΔCosts, additional costs for new technology relative to comparator, expressed in terms of equivalent QALYs (see previous footnote on net
health beneﬁt).
ΔQALYs, incremental quality-adjusted life years for new technology relative to comparator.
ΔNB, incremental net beneﬁt for new technology relative to comparator, expressed in terms of equivalent QALYs (i.e. difference between
ΔQALYs and ΔCosts).
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of the evidence than the health sector and regarded realisation 1 in Table 1b as more likely to occur (gain of
6 QALYs) and realisation 3 as less likely (no gain with research), then their assessment would lead them to
believe that the health system should undertake and pay for the research (because the health system will gain
6 QALYs under realisation 1, while the manufacturer will only gain a revenue of 3 QALYs, which is equivalent
to their expected gain under Approve without further research). Therefore, the prospects of research and decid-
ing who might reasonably be expected to pay for/conduct it will depend on information asymmetries that can
arise if the manufacturer has some information about uncertainty, while the regulator or health system does not.
Another important factor relating to incentivising research in medical devices is that other manufacturers can
sometimes claim near-equivalence to a device that is already on the market, thereby avoiding the need to collect
data on their own device.3 This also raises the important issue of transferability of evidence and learning across
devices. The extent to which evidence from one technology is applicable to another is likely to depend on the
class of the device.
Here, we have only outlined the most straightforward application of the approach when there is only one
device available to treat a given condition. If other devices are available (or likely to become available in the
near future) and/or evidence and learning can be inferred from one device to another, then other policies will
be required. For example, if the ﬁrst device to treat the condition is undergoing OIR or AWR and another de-
vice is deemed to be near equivalent, it would make sense to include that device in the existing OIR/AWR
scheme. This would both speed up the accumulation of data and also provide further information on whether
the near-equivalence assumption is justiﬁed. Furthermore, in situations whether the manufacturers were being
asked to contribute ﬁnancially to the OIR/AWR scheme, it would enable some cost-sharing between the two
manufacturers.
Assessing the value of the technology and the future value of research for medical devices is further com-
plicated by the immediacy of competitive products and the speed of partial obsolescence as technologies evolve
over time. This makes it difﬁcult to assess the timescale over which additional information generated by re-
search is likely to be valuable for. Some assessment may be possible on the basis of historical evidence and
expert judgments about future innovations in the area and other evaluative research that may be planned or un-
derway (e.g. through registries, expert elicitation and historic evidence of diffusion).
4. DISCUSSION
This paper has set out the conceptual issues that require consideration when dealing with uncertainty and the
value of further research in relation to medical devices. The paper has focussed on the principles and assess-
ments that are required rather than the methods of analysis. This distinction between the assessments required
and the methods of analysis recognises that how the assessments might be informed is likely to differ across
different types of healthcare systems and jurisdictions. The methods of analysis are likely to be more straight-
forward to implement than the principles themselves (e.g. using standard cost-effectiveness analysis, probabi-
listic sensitivity analysis, value of information analysis and statistical assessment of learning curve data). Even
if these concepts are not implemented through formal methods of analysis, some consideration should be given
to them as part of the deliberation process when making decisions about a technology. For example, even in
health systems where there is an absence of ﬁrm budget constraints or where economic analysis is not explicitly
incorporated into the decision-making process, the same principles can be applied (Claxton et al., 2015). The
key considerations are outlined in this work, but we do not presuppose how different aspects of health gained
and forgone might be measured and valued as this is going to differ across different healthcare systems.
The development of the framework is intended to improve transparency in communicating the considerations
that play an important role in the adoption of innovative clinically and cost-effective medical technologies and to
3This is the basis of the US Food and Drug Administration 510(k) notiﬁcation scheme, discussed in the paper by Ciani et al. in this journal
supplement.
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identify when research might reasonably be expected to be provided by sponsors. This is important given the
growing interest among both payers and producers of medical products for agreements that involve some form
of ‘risk-sharing’ (Garrison et al., 2013). An example is the recent NHS England Commissioning through
Evaluation programme, which is for devices and procedures which have typically less evidence available to sup-
port the development of a full commissioning policy. These programmes allow patients early access to promising
new treatments while new data is collected. Such programmes should consider the issues raised in this paper, in
particular, those relating to irrecoverable costs. Many healthcare systems are now adopting ‘coverage with evi-
dence development’ (CED) schemes of a similar nature to the one proposed here. For example, the French have
introduced a CED scheme under Article L. 165-1-1 of the French Social Security Code, Germany has introduced
a CED scheme under Section 137e SGB V run by the Federal Joint Committee, while the US has more than 20
documented performance-based risk-sharing arrangements including CED (Garrison et al., 2013; Martelli and
Van den Brink, 2014). All of these schemes are aimed at narrowing the gap between getting innovative medical
devices into practice and funding studies for the collection of valuable evidence. CED schemes are intended to
contribute to improved collaboration between healthcare systems and manufacturers to ensure value to all stake-
holders. If these schemes are to work effectively then improved collaboration at all stages of the process is re-
quired. One of the challenges for many countries is the separation between decision-making bodies
responsible for making reimbursement decisions from research funding bodies responsible for making research
decisions. This makes it all the more important that manufacturers retain an incentive to fund research. In this
work, we have highlighted the circumstances when manufacturers have an incentive to either price accordingly
to achieve approval, conduct research at an earlier stage so that the need for additional evidence is eliminated or
accept restricted access until the results of research become known. It seems important that some consideration
should be given to the likely prospects that research will be conducted and who should reasonably be expected
to pay for it, that is whether it is a priority for public funding or for manufacturers to undertake. The prospects
of performing research under OIR or AWR schemes are further complicated by the fact that there are potential
information asymmetries arising if the manufacturer has some information about uncertainty, while the regulator
does not. The agency relationship between the manufacturer and health system will also change in the face of
varying uncertainty patterns. Thus, there is an important link between price, uncertainty, value of additional
evidence and potential information asymmetry between the agencies involved.
In conclusion, CED schemes for medical devices offer great potential for getting timely access to new inno-
vative technologies and the collection of valuable evidence to reduce uncertainty but there are a number of im-
portant considerations relating to the likely prospects that research will be conducted and who might reasonably
be expected to pay for it.
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